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THE RELATION OF TRIAL COUNSEL TO THE PUBLIC
JOHN ALAN APPLM °N
SHAWvx often felt a tug of sympathy for the poor layman who be-
comes involved in a legal controversy. As a rule, his sole contacts
with attorneys are social, if indeed he has any contact with them at
all-and a sparkling social personality is not necessarily correlated
with great legal abilities. In addition, the lawyer who has examined
his abstract seldom would be the man to defend his interests in court.
The individual who falls ill can look in the classified section of
the telephone directory under the heading of "physicians" and get a
pretty fair idea of the fields of competence of those particular indi-
viduals. But, when one requiring the services of a lawyer looks
under the heading "attorneys", he encounters no assistance what-
ever. Whether he needs assistance upon a copyright, a tax matter,
the drafting of a will, or the trial of a personal injury case he en-
counters only a mass of names and no information whatever con-
cerning the competence of these individuals.
It is true that about half of the actively practicing attorneys are
sufficiently cognizant of their own shortcomings that they will call
in a specialist to assist them in a field where they find themselves
deficient. The other half-no; they prefer to struggle along and
make their mistakes at the expense of the client, who is rarely even
aware of the fact that a mistake has been made. Time and again I
have seen tens of thousands of dollars lost to clients through bungling
estate planning, inadequate handling of relationships between a
corporation and its key stockholder, or other legal situations. A few
good mal.practice suits with resounding verdicts might help greatly
to increase the ethical standards of such lawyers.
When it comes to personal injury cases, the shortcomings of
attorneys appear in even sharper light. An attorney who would
immediately call in a tax expert or patent lawyer in a specialized
situation deems himself sufficiently competent to appraise the value
of a case and to attempt its negotiation, with the idea of calling in a
trial specialist only if it appears that he cannot settle the case. Again
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because of his ineptness in appraising the case and evaluating its
manifold possibilities, cases worth $6,000 are settled for $1,500;
$25,000 cases are settled for perhaps $10,000. The more ethical at-
torney whose prime work is in general practice has a higher regard
for the interests of his clients. He tends to call in the trial specialist
immediately and the client fares much better.
In many situations, I have found it necessary to extricate at-
torneys from predicaments where they had permitted the statute of
limitations to run, or had given an inadequate notice to a city, or
whose pleadings failed to state %7 proper or "the" proper basis for
a judicial remedy. Occasionally such counsel is sought only after
a case has been tried and lost, in seeking a reversal upon appeal
where a record has been inadequately preserved. There is much to
be said for the English system of limiting the handling of litigation
to barristers. At least, in these times, when there is already criticism
of the handling of matters in court, it seems that a greater responsi-
bility should be placed upon the bar to find some method of inform-
ing the lay public of those persons of ethical standards properly
qualified to handle their contested matters. This could also, it
might be pointed out, help greatly to reduce the incidence of ambu-
lance chasing, since the layman so approached could easily check
the telephone directory to see if those persons had received the re-
quired rating. And, since the really competent trial men do not have
to chase ambulances, and the rating in question would not be
conferred upon an unethical practitioner, ambulance chasing could
quickly be halted.
What are some methods by which such ratings could be con-
ferred? In the first place, the state legislature could provide by
statute that no attorney should be permitted to handle a damage
case in a court of record involving a net damage in excess of $1,500
unless qualified, under standards to be set up by the supreme court,
as a trial counsel. Such standards could be set up somewhat as
follows: (1) that such attorney have not less than five years of
active practice at the bar; (2) that he be qualified under a point
system upon the basis of investigative experience, research experi-
ence, and participation as a junior in the conduct of trials; (3) that
he be approved by the vote of three-fourths of the judges before
whom he has handled cases as possessing marked trial ability, good
demeanor, and high ethical standards; (4) that he pass a written
examination upon the substantive law of negligence and the pro-
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cedural aspects of trials; (5) that he be found upon investigation
to be of high moral character and to have been in no way involved
in the solicitation of cases or other unethical practices.
Under those circumstances, the man could then receive the
designation of "trial counsel" or other title, with such standards and
title being established upon a national basis. A provision could be
made for waiver of the written examination as to those attorneys
who possess all of the above qualifications, who have practiced
actively for more than ten years with "av" ratings who obviously
meet the other standards. Unless they are so qualified by rating
and otherwise, then they should be required to take the examina-
tion and be investigated to avoid having active shysters admitted
into that group.
This would correspond closely to the standards set up for phy-
sicians who desire to be recognized as board members. There is no
reason why such standards cannot also be set up in the law. To
this point, any such proposals presented to the American Bar Asso-
ciation have met uniform resistance from those general practitioners
who are afraid that they will lose a few fees. But while they are
worrying about their fees, the entire bar is losing the respect of lay-
men. Only if we maintain high standards of practice in the courts
can the status of lawyers be improved. For it is by public actions
and conduct that lawyers are judged, and we should be certain that
those who represent the maimed and the injured, or who defend
against claims, maintain those high standards which we believe are
necessary for the protection of the public.
It is not only in the representation of injured persons that these
problems arise. Perhaps even more problems are generated where
defense matters come under consideration. Few defense attorneys
stop to realize the conflict in interest which may arise while acting
in a dual capacity. Let us examine these problems more closely.
Many of the ethical problems which are presented in connection
with liability insurance are encountered where recoveries by plain-
tiffs are in excess of the applicable policy limits. Usually, but not
always, this means that the policy limits are relatively small-per-
haps $10,000/$20,000 or $25,000/$50,000.
The insurance company, of course, being in the business, plays
the law of averages. The policyholder who is in court perhaps for
the only time in his life cannot afford to concern himself with "aver-
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ages". There is no averaging so far as he is concerned-this is his
lawsuit. It may be the only time he will ever be in court and he is
definitely concerned about what his risk of personal loss may be. He
cannot afford to gamble, even if the company can. If his policy
limits were high, then he could relax-but usually the company
would then be quick to settle to avoid the risk of greater loss. This
being true, the use of "averages" would tend to indicate that the
insurer is, to some extent, willing to permit the risk of loss to fall
upon the insured.
In such an instance the insurance company may argue that the
insured saw fit to run this risk by electing to carry a small policy-
that no question would have arisen had he paid a few more dollars
of premium and carried adequate insurance. To some extent that
is true. However, more frequently, we find that the agent of the
insurance company wrote the insurance and selected the amount
in which it was written. Rarely does the insured ask any questions
because he doesn't know enough about it to appreciate the risk or
to make a deliberate choice as to the amount of insurance to be
carried. Had the agent told him that for $4 more he could double
the protection he would receive, few would hesitate. A different
practical and a different legal circumstance is presented than that
which is found in the ordinary situation. If the company writes
business knowing that the great majority of the policies are in
low limit amounts, it should realize that questions are bound to arise
from time to time of a dual interest-circumstances presenting a
definite conflict between its interests and those of the policy-holder.
To illustrate the inadequacy of coverage, probably half of my
readers have policies which, for property damage liability, are limited
to $10,000 in amount. Look at your policies when you have a chance.
Yet I have seen case after case where somebody strikes or sideswipes a
gasoline truck so as to cause it to overturn, with the burning gasoline
destroying the tank truck and setting fire to other property with a
combined loss of from $50,000 to $100,000. One large tractor manu-
facturer now requires all of its employees to carry property damage
liability in an amount of not less than $100,000. The average indi-
vidual does not even think of property damage as exposing him
to any great hazard, and the limits which would ordinarily be writ-
ten by an agent are certainly not adequate. And the hazards of
substantial verdicts are even greater where personal injuries are
involved.
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There is no excuse for an attorney carrying a low limit policy,
because he knows or should know better. However, for the layman
who is not acquainted with litigation or with the importance of
checking up upon his agent's judgment, these questions of excess
coverages are going to continue to arise until such time as com-
panies either take the limits off policies or insist upon writing them
in an adequate amount for an adequate premium.
Wherever there is the possibility of an excess judgment, or of an
exposed but unprotected hazard, ethical problems are created upon
the part of the attorney who represents the insured of the insurance
company. Any attorney who accepts such employment must be very
careful in his handling of the case throughout. He must first ask
himself: "Whom do I represent? Do I represent the policyholder
or do I represent the insurance company? If I represent both, at
what point must I stop carrying water on both shoulders?"'
It is clear that if a plaintiff's attorney failed to communicate
an offer of settlement to his client, and lost his lawsuit, not only
would he be guilty of a breach of ethics but he could be faced
with a possible malpractice action. What, then, of the situation
where he is the defendant with a possible excess exposure, and an
offer of settlement is made to the attorney employed by the insur-
ance company, which offer is within the policy limits? The insur-
ance company insists that it has the sole and exclusive right to
control the litigation, but if the insured knew about such offer he
might insist that the insurance company accept it, or take steps to
negotiate for a settlement as to his excess exposure.
The statement of principles with respect to the practice of law
formulated by representatives of the American Bar Association and
various insurance companies, including the American Mutual Al-
liance, Association of Casualty and Surety Companies, International
Claim Association, National Association of Independent Insurers,
and others, expressly provides:
"4(b). The companies and their representatives, including
attorneys, will inform the policyholder of the progress of any
suit against the policyholder and its probable results. If any
diversity of interest shall appear between the policyholder and
the company, the policyholder shall be fully advised of the
situation and invited to retain his own counsel. Without limiting
1 See discussion in Federation of Insurance Counsel Quarterly for January,
1954, which deals with the ethical relationships and problems presented.
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the general application of the foregoing, it is contemplated that
this will be done in any case in which it appears probable that
an amount in excess of the limit of the policy is involved, or in
any case in which the company is defending under a reserva-
tion of rights, or in any case in which the prosecution of a
counterclaim appears advantageous to the policyholder."
These are not meant to be hollow phrases. The mere sending
of a formal notice to the policyholder is not sufficient, when he is
informed privately by the attorney or the adjuster that "there is
no real cause for concern." It means acting in the representation
of the insured in the highest good faith, and nothing less can be
acceptable under the standard of ethics imposed upon attorneys.
They must keep the insured informed of the progress of the suit,
the probable results thereof, and offers which are made, whether
they are below or in excess of the policy limits, and the action of
the company thereon. If the attorney feels that the insured will
suffer personal loss as a result of a course of conduct which he, as
an attorney, is pursuing, full and complete information must be
given.
The most recent case which gives an adequate discussion of
this subject is Allstate Insurance Co. v. Keller.2 In that case, be-
cause of misstatements made by the insured, the court indicated that
it felt that the insurance company probably had a complete policy
defense. However, after the insured had changed his story to the
insurance company, the company had its attorneys file their appear-
ance for him in court. Subsequently they took a detailed deposition
of the insured in which he related the facts relating to the accident
and again reiterated the story he had last given the company. At
the time of taking such deposition, the attorneys anticipated the
filing of a suit for declaratory judgment but did not inform the
insured of that fact. The court, after reviewing the facts which
related to the conflict of interest stated:
"It is the law of this State that an attorney is required to
disclose to his client all facts and circumstances within his
knowledge, which, in his honest judgment, might be likely to
affect the performance of his duty for that client. Catherwood
v. Morris, 360 Ill. 478, 481 (1935). A client may presume
from an attorney's failure to disclose matters material to his
employment that the attorney has no interest which will inter-
fere with his devotion to the cause confided in him, or betray
his judgment. Hunter v. Troup, 315 Ill. 293, 802 (1925). As
2 17 IlM. App. 2d 44, 149 N.E.2d 482 (1958).
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a New York court has succinctly pointed out, an insured's
attorneys are bound by the same high standards which govern
all attorneys, whether or not privately retained. . . .Where
an insurer's attorney has reason to believe that the discharge
of his duties to his client, the insured, will conflict with his
duties to his employer, the insurer, it becomes incumbent upon
him to terminate his relationship with the client. Reynolds v.
Maramorosch, 208 Misc. 626, 144 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1955); Helm
v. Inter Insurance Exchange, 354 Mo. 935, 192 S.W.2d 417
(1946); Hammett v. McIntyre, 114 Cal. App. 2d 148, 249 P.2d
885 (1952). It was the duty of plaintiff's attorneys upon learn-
ing of the possible conflict of interests between plaintiff and
defendant, to immediately notify defendant of this fact."3
And I think all of us who are familiar with trial practice and
conscious of the ethical duties owing to clients would agree that
such was a reasonable and proper result in that case. It is clear
that neither the attorney nor the insurance company can be per-
mitted to occupy a position where divided loyalties exist-at least
not without a full disclosure to the insured so that he may pro-
tect himself fully. We will return to this presently. But, first let
us look to the situation of excess judgments in general and try to
classify some of the factors which bring them into being and which
may expose the insurance company, by reason of the actions of
its counsel, to a liability over and above its policy limits.
First, there is always a possibility that the verdict in a personal
injury suit was the result of fraud or perjury. In that event, there
is ordinarily a remedy. By careful investigation, fraud can be
uncovered and a new trial can normally be secured. At least, the
insurer could not be charged with the duty, nor could its counsel,
to anticipate fraud or perjury.
Second, there is the possibility that the judgment rendered
seems excessive, from the point of view of foresight, because of
sympathy for injuries of the plaintiff. Ordinarily, such sympathy
should have been anticipated when both sides are aware of the
nature and extent of the injuries. There is no excuse, under mod-
em discovery procedures, of ignorance in that regard. When the
injuries are known, and the normal reactions of jurors in that area
can be anticipated, it would scarcely seem a proper excuse by the
insurance company or its counsel to say: "Of this we could not
be aware."
8 At 52,53, 149 N.E.2d at 486.
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Third, it may be argued that the excess verdict was the result
of evidence which was not known to the insurance company. Again,
under modem discovery techniques and with the investigative pro-
cedures and facilities available to a professional defender of law-
suits, this would not seem an argument which could be utilized very
often. If the company is taken by surprise by evidence of which
it could have known, such an excuse would be unavailing.
Fourth, it is possible that the excess judgment resulted from
poor trial work. In such case, of course, that would afford no
excuse to the company because the trial lawyer is its servant, selected
by the company and paid by it. However, even though the average
employer may have recourse against his servant for a payment
required arising from the servant's neglect, it is doubtful that
recourse could be secured by the company against its trial attorney,
unless his conduct was so flagrant as to shock the conscience of ordi-
nary men. Usually the company is aware of the degree of experience
and skill possessed by the attorney at the time it engages his serv-
ices-and it can expect no greater degree of skill than he is known
to possess.
In order not to leave the last situation completely beclouded,
let us illustrate. If, for example, by the browbeating of witnesses
or arguing with opposing counsel, an attorney antagonizes a jury,
that is a matter of technique upon which the opinion and pro-
cedures of attorneys may well vary, just as different physicians may
have varying techniques for the treatment of migrane headaches.
However, if the attorney comes to court intoxicated, such could fall
into the category of personal liability.
Even as the attorney is entitled to employ his discretion in the
defense of a case, so may the insurance company. One of the most
critical situations which can arise is where the decision is made
to admit liability and contest only the matter of damages. In many
instances, the denial of liability and a contest upon the subject may
serve to inflame the jury, particularly where the circumstances of
the occurrence were quite aggravated. An admission of liability in
such a situation may be an excellent strategic maneuver. But on a
second suit, if the insured comes into court and says "they had no
right to admit liability. If they had not, we might have defeated
the claim," a real problem arises. The insurance company, in that
situation, using excellent local counsel as a rule, has a right to
make such a decision. Certainly it is not going to fritter away its
8
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own funds, if it can possibly do otherwise. But, for its own pro-
tection, it should encourage the insured to have personal counsel
and go over the proposed procedure carefully with such counsel and
secure his assent thereto.
Fifth, rather than negligence in the trial, there may be tactical
errors which may expose the company, if not counsel, to criticism
or loss. One might be in the selection of local counsel of insufficient
skill or experience, in an effort to avoid the higher rates of skilled
trial counsel. This has become particularly critical in recent years,
where insurance companies attempt to secure trial counsel for $15
an hour, let us say, when the same attorneys may be averaging $50
an hour from other business. The company may refuse to engage
local counsel at the place where the case is to be tried, resulting in
an unfavorable jury, or, by importing counsel from a distance, cer-
tainly at least suggest the presence of insurance. Or it may fail
properly to perfect an appeal, take the case to the wrong court
upon review, or be guilty of some other omission or error which
exposes its insured to personal loss, including the failure properly
to supersede a judgment.
Sixth and last, probably the cases which present the most
argument arise from failure to settle a borderline case which could
have gone either way-but, if it goes for the plaintiff, will undoubt-
edly exceed the policy limits. The question is then whether or not
the company has a right to gamble and expose its insured to a pos-
sibility of: great loss.
As is well known to the average reader, there are two rules
which are followed throughout the United States. One is the rule
of negligence; the other is the rule of bad faith. Actually, in the
enforcement of the principles, there is not too much difference except
in lip service between the two rules. One who is a professional in
the defense of lawsuits is held to a substantial duty, and the failure
to observe that duty may constitute bad faith. That, in substance,
is also the definition of negligence. Except where courts of review
are composed largely of ex-defense attorneys, this usually becomes
a question for the trier of fact. And since there are more policy-
holders than insurance agents upon jury panels, they frown upon a
gamble taken with the policyholder's funds.
There are certain situations which make more demonstrable
the fact of bad faith, so as to jeopardize the position of the insurance
company in an excess suit. One of them is, of course, the situation
9
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where the company by making a ridiculous offer forecloses the possi-
bility of settlement. Let us say that a case is likely to result in a
$15,000 jury verdict, and the case can be settled for $7,500. An offer
of $1,500 is so patently ridiculous as to close the door to further
settlement negotiations, and such would then seem to constitute
bad faith rather than simply negligence.
A second situation of aggravated conduct is the failure to inform
the insured that he has a right to and should engage personal coun-
sel to protect him against excess liability. Since the policy gives the
insurance company the right to conduct the defense, it has a corre-
lative duty to inform the insured of his rights to protect himself.
A third situation is the failure to communicate to the insured,
under the statement of principles, offers of settlement which the
company has received, whether within or in excess of the policy
limits, in order that he may take steps to protect himself. Similarly,
if he does have personal counsel, the failure to keep such counsel
informed as to the status of the case, or the progress of negotiations,
would constitute bad faith.
A fourth situation is a demand by the company that the insured
contribute to a settlement offer which is less than the policy limits.
This used to be quite common, but is rather infrequent now. How-
ever, the situation is still encountered where, upon a $10,000 policy,
an offer of $9,000 will be received. The company may state to its
insured that it is willing to pay $7,500, and that if he wants to settle
he must contribute the other $1,500. That is considered bad faith
as a matter of law, under many cases.
A fifth situation is closing the door to settlement negotiations
by refusal to disclose the policy limits. It is a known fact that an
attorney handling a case worth $30,000 in settlement will be willing
to settle for, perhaps, $22,500 if he knows the policy limit is only
$25,000, in order to avoid imposing a personal loss upon the insured.
The company has no right to protect itself from excess liability by
stating that it will not disclose its policy limits, when such effectively
forecloses the possibility of receiving an offer of less than the policy
limits. Such constitutes bad faith exercised in complete derogation
of the rights of the policyholder. Many states now require the dis-
closure of policy limits; but, even in those jurisdictions which do
not, the company is playing with fire when it cuts off the possibility
of receiving an offer within the policy limits by its refusal to open
the door to reasonable negotiation.
10
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In each of these situations, the defense attorney is presented
with the possibility of some danger of personal liability. Suppose
the company should become insolvent, and the case could have been
settled within the policy limits had they been disclosed-at a time
when the settlement sum would have been paid from company
funds. The attorney has joined in and condoned the act of the
company. May he then be held liable for the resultant loss to the
insured?
There have been no cases upon this as yet, but there undoubt-
edly will be. I would not venture to speculate what the results
would be in each jurisdiction. It would seem that each case would
turn on its own facts. If the conduct of the attorney was such as
to constitute a breach of the ethical duties which he owed to the
policyholder, as his attorney, then clearly a liability would exist.
If there is no ethical breach, but a question of judgment involved,
then a different result could follow. But in each situation, it must
be apparent that he acted in the best interests of the insured as well
as in the best interests of the company. And, under present day
circumstances, it is unfortunately true that frequently the action
of the defense attorney does not conform to those standards.
As an individual, not acquainted with the processes of law,
there is not much that the insured can do to protect himself. How-
ever, when represented by competent counsel, looking after the
interests of the insured alone, there are several things that can be
done. The first of these is to ascertain whether or not a settlement
can be made within the policy limits; and, if such a settlement can
be secured, and it is a proposal which is reasonable in light of the
circumstances regarding liability and damages, then a demand may
be made upon the insurance company to so settle. In such an in-
stance, the demand should be detailed and set out the circumstances
which the attorney deems present aspects of particular danger and
his own fears that the judgment in excess of the policy limits might
well otherwise result.
Since the company is bound to use at least good faith in settle-
ment, the receipt of such notice makes it aware of the dangers in-
herent in failing to settle, if it did not have such knowledge earlier.
It must thereafter walk as on eggs. But, if it refuses to settle, there
are still several things which can be done for the protection of the
insured.
11
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He has a right to negotiate a settlement of any excess liability
or of any possible uninsured coverage. If, for example, he has only
$25,000 of protection, he may from his personal resources make a
payment to the plaintiff in return for an agreement not to collect
any excess judgment from him personally, provided, of course, such
agreement is made in good faith.4 In the second situation described,
there may be a question as to whether the accident happened before
the insurance coverage went into effect or after it termniated, or
whether the particular act which caused the injury was within the
scope of the insuring agreements, or the insurance company may
claim that a policy defense exists such as a failure to give prompt
notice. In any of these situations the insured may negotiate with
the third person to limit the scope of collection in the event of re-
covery to the proceeds of insurance policies existent upon the risk."5
It will readily be seen in such instances that neither a release
nor a covenant not-to-sue can be executed, because of the fact that
litigation must continue against the insured in order that his liability
may be determined before the policy coverage can be ascertained.
However, a stipulation which concisely recites the understanding
of the parties may be utilized in those instances. In the Krutsinger
case, heretofore referred to, an even more involved situation was
presented. That was a dramshop case where I was representing
the plaintiff. It arose out of habitual intoxication, with suit by the
wife and children for loss to means of support. Upon the particular
taverns, there were a total of six insurance companies covering vary-
ing periods of time. Five of the six companies wanted to work out
a settlement; the sixth refused to do anything. It apparently figured
it could compel the other companies to pay its share of the load in
order to secure a release or a covenant
In that case we handled it by stipulation. Since there were
minors involved, we filed a petition in the county court through the
legal guardian setting up the proposed settlement and asking for an
order permitting the stipulation to be executed by the legal guard-
ian which would permit him to proceed with the litigation but to
look solely to the proceeds of the policies issued by the recalcitrant
4 Krutsinger v. fllinois Casualty Co., 10 Ill. 2d 518, 141 N.E.2d 16 (1957);
Brewer v. Maryland Casualty Co., 245 S.W.2d 532, 535, 536 (Tex. Civ. App.
1952).5 General Accident, Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Louisville Home Tele-
phone Co., 175 Ky. 96, 193 S.W. 1031, 1034 (1917); McAleenan v. Massa-
chusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 190 App. Div. 657, 159 N.Y. Supp. 401, 405(1916); Pickett v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 60 S.C. 477, 38 S.E. 160 (1901).
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company as to collection, and to accept on behalf of the plaintiffs
the amounts proposed by the other companies to be paid as a partial
remission of collectibility to that extent. The order was entered by
the county court and we proceeded to trial.
We recovered judgment several times in excess of the total
offers made beforehand and then filed a suit against the insurance
company. It came in and claimed that it had been released by such
settlement, charging fraud, collusion, lack of cooperation, failure of
the insured to render to it the exclusive right to defend or settle,
and other matters. At the close of the plaintiff's case, the trial court
directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs.
The judgment was appealed to the appellate court of Illinois
which affirmed and soundly spanked the attorneys for the insurance
company for the charges made of fraud and collusion, and referred
to the conduct of the company in somewhat uncomplimentary terms.
It perfected an appeal to the Illinois supreme court which, in turn,
affirmed both the trial court and the appellate court.0
There is one other situation which is somewhat unique but
which arises rather frequently these days where there are several
very large automobile insurance companies. That is where the
company finds itself on both sides of the fence.
This situation arises where both automobiles are insured with
the same company. A collision occurs and the drivers of both auto-
mobiles, let us say, are injured. Each insists that the collision was
the fault of the other. Many companies, in that situation, have tried
to insist that they have the right to defend both the original suit
and the counterclaim, to take confidential statements from their
insureds and to use it to their detriments, to make investigations
but to refuse to disclose the results thereof to the individuals con-
cerned o:r to their personal attorneys. That is, of course, utter non-
sense. It would clearly be in violation of public policy to permit the
same interested party to control both sides of the litigation. There
is no duty whatever to cooperate where there is a conflict in interest 7
And, in such a situation, each party has an absolute right to be rep-
resented by counsel whose allegiance is solely to that individual who
may prosecute the action desired by that individual and defend
against the proceedings brought by the other. It would be the duty
6 Krutsinger v. Illinois Casualty Co., 10 Ill. 2d 518, 141 N.E.2d 16 (1957).
7 Bernadich v. Bernadich, 287 Mich. 137, 283 N.W. 5, 8 (1938); Latronica
v. Royal Indemnity Co., 8 IMI. App. 2d 337, 342, 132 N.E.2d 16 (1956).
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of the insurance company to pay the judgment rendered against the
loser and probably to pay a reasonable attorney's fee for the defense
of each such proceeding, since that would have been its obligation
under other circumstances. 8 The insured must give notice of the
occurrence and of the suit, if any, but his duty ends there. The
company must immediately apprise him of the conflict of interest
and of his right to have personal counsel, or it might well be held
liable for the exercise of bad faith in its relationships.
It will be seen from the foregoing matters that whether trial
counsel is representing the plaintiff or the defendant that his task
is not an easy one. At all times he must conform to the highest
ethical standards, which are governed largely by the dictates of his
conscience, since the two are largely identical in right thinking men.
Each person must understand that he cannot serve two masters,
where a conflict in interest appears, and he must discharge the duty
devolving upon him as an advocate with complete fidelity. There
is sometimes a tendency upon the part of defense counsel to defer
too greatly to corporate clients; but this deference should in no way
be permitted to impair the discharge of the primary obligation.
As attorneys, upon whatever side of the fence we may find
ourselves, we must realize that ethical standards are not hollow prin-
ciples. They are vital rules which govern the manner in which we
discharge our functions and by which we are judged by the public.
In addition, since the public is in a position to judge the bar only
by the standards of competence which it observes in the handling
of litigated matters, then we must take steps to see that the public
is advised-so that it may choose wisely-who are the competent
advocates. We must, as the medical profession has done, impose
certain standards for trial counsel to conform to in courts of record,
and then see that those standards are known to and appreciated
by the public. When this has been done, then much of the stigma
which surrounds trial work, and particularly personal injury cases,
will disappear.
8 O'Morrow v. Borad, 27 Cal. 2d 794, 167 P.2d 483 (1946).
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